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The Muslim Veil in France: Between Power and Silence, between 
Visibility and Invisibility
 We must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things, how those who can and tho-
se who cannot speak of them are distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or which form of 
discretion is required in either case (Foucault 1969: 121).
Abstract
This paper will explore the contingency and fl uidity of religious freedom in France and stress the existence of overlapping, 
competing and coexisting legal discourses in terms of national security and public order. In response to the Muslim veil, 
changing power structures, changing societal norms and new faces of injustice, established doctrines are reconsidered, 
reformulated and partly replaced by competing doctrines and hypotheses. Given the relative indeterminacy of law on 
the concept of secularism and French neutrality, it is no surprise that the problem of interpretation has always been one 
of the focal points of attention for legal practice and drafting. 
1. Shaping the ‘Outside’
The French society has always faced new challenges and achieved new goals so that its citizens 
live in a friendly, secured, communicative and harmonized environment. Society has always been 
an ‘endless evolving object’ (Wagner 2011), a ‘living reality’ (Gény 1922: 120), ‘a living monster’ 
(Bentham in Burns/Hart 1977: 195) with variable constraints depending altogether on historical, 
political and legal aspects. 
With a strong anti-discrimination policy and the insertion of people from multiple origins in 
the workplace, France is now facing a new challenge. The progress towards diversity and open-
ness has resulted in the expansion of religious practices. However, these practices are no longer 
relegated to the private sphere and now pervade the public space with the use of visible religious 
signs. In recent years, the right to which an individual can, should, or must not manifest his/her 
religious practice or worship by wearing particular clothing or religious symbols has become very 
contentious. With new questions arising from the evolution of society, i.e. the role of Islam, the 
increase in religious practices arising from socio-economic fears, secularism has to be rethought, 
revised and reframed. 
2. Secularism – A French exception
At the period of buoyant religious, political and legal controversies, Napoleon’s Concordat of 
1801 was a fi rst step towards the stabilization of such a situation.  This complimented the main 
contributions from the revolutionary period, namely to dissociate the political and religious po-
wers and to bring to the forefront a cultual pluralism. This pluralism was dedicated to a system 
of recognized and commonly agreed sects. Napoleon’s Concordat recognized Catholicism as the 
most practiced religion by French citizens, but denied the Church the offi cial status of ‘national 
religion’:
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 The Government of the Republic recognizes that the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion is the re-
ligion of the great majority of the French citizens. (Law of 18 Germinal Year X – 8 April 1802).
Similarly, on 17 March 1808, Napoleon signed a decree whereby the foundation of the French Ju-
daism was established and recognized with a series of regulations. He made it clear that Judaism 
should not undermine the civic morality and responsibility of any citizen and should not interfere 
with the obligations and duties of citizens.
The second major change appeared with the Act of 9 December 1905 when the legal regime of 
the relationship between the state and the sects was established without any explicit reference to 
secularism, even though it remained the key pillar. The full constitutional acceptance of the prin-
ciple of secularism was confi rmed within the ambit of Article 1 of the Constitution of 1946, and 
of Article 1 of the Constitution of 4 October 1958 under the following terms:
 France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of 
all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It 
shall be organised on a decentralised basis.
French secularism comprises three main principles: state neutrality, religious freedom and respect 
of cultual pluralism. It also leads to the notion of freedom of conscience or of religion which 
France has ratifi ed in international treaties. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights provides that:
 In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such mi-
norities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. 
Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that 
 The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the pre-
sent Covenant shall be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
The Council of Europe’s European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR), commenced in 1953, also has a non-discrimination provision in Article 14 stipulating 
 The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discri-
mination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Secularism bears in itself a web of plural meanings, or as an open texture (Hart 1976). It nurtures 
itself from the experiences it encounters1. Indeed, the State does not prioritize any religion but 
should also not disregard any of them. With the 1905 Act, the principle is the absence of distinc-
tion between formerly recognized sects and others. The state as guarantor of religious freedom, 
has to protect all minor sects against discrimination. Among all the principles of secularism, it is 
clearly established that all religions have the freedom of expression and are equally treated under 
the fundamental principle of the State: its neutrality (Jean Carbonnier 1969).
2.1. Legal Contours of the Concept ‘Neutrality’
The progress towards diversity has always been very slow, but had a key start after the French 
Revolution in which the state had to guarantee equality without privilege regarding the practice 
of religions and had not to privilege a religion over another. In constructing the French identity, 
religious symbols in the public space were restricted, regulated and led to a series of legal deci-
sions in the courts. 
The practice of religion is restricted to the ‘inside’ as a personal choice and willingness. This 
principle of neutrality is not new and was already enshrined in earlier French regulations and le-
1 See Rapport du Haut conseil à l’intégration 2000.
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gislations. On 2 November 1882, a circular was issued by the Education Ministry and gave discre-
tionary powers to the Prefects to remove any religious emblem whenever necessary. Public ed-
ucation enforced this principle with both the Ferry Act of 28 March 18822 and the Goblet Act of 
30 October 18863. Furthermore, Article 28 of the 1905 Act provides that the use of signs or religi-
ous emblems on public monuments is strictly forbidden in order to comply with State neutrality4. 
This principle applies not only to civil servants but also to users in the public sphere. A series 
of judgments followed this principle. For example, if the religious opinions of civil servants can-
not be considered as compatible with their duties of strict neutrality, the manifestation of such 
opinions can challenge this principle. However, there is a need to distinguish civil activities from 
private ones. In an administrative case of July 8, 20035, the judge declared that the veil worn by a 
work controller in the exercise of her tasks was contrary to the principle of State secularism. The 
Court of Appeal of Lyon followed the same argument, asserting that the principle of secularism 
was a fundamental pillar of the French Republic.  In this case, the showing of her religious beliefs 
in the exercise of her position was  a sign confi rming her religious affi liation and therefore consti-
tuted a breach to her professional obligations as professional negligence.6
As additionally illustrated by a series of similar legal decisions, the exercise of religious free-
dom fi nds its limits in a neutral civil service. Neutrality is a core concept for all civil servants in 
the execution of their duties. All of them must comply with this principle. Even though the mo-
dalities of applications are necessarily variable in the tasks civil servants carry out, they all must 
comply with this obligation of neutrality. The European Court on Human Rights also recognized 
this principle of neutrality of civil servants ensuring a fair balance between the fundamental rights 
of an individual to freedom of expression and the legitimate rights of a democratic state to make 
sure that the civil service complies with Article 10, Paragraph 27. 
In a 1989 opinion, the Conseil d’Etat found that secularism and the wearing of religious dress 
could be compatible under the following terms:
 It results from the constitutional and legislative texts and from France’s international engagement… 
that the principle of secularism in public education, which is one of the elements of secularism of the 
state and of the neutrality of all public services, requires that education be dispensed with respect, on 
the one hand, for this neutrality by the programs and teachers, and on the other hand, for the students’ 
liberty of conscience … This freedom on the students’ part includes the right to express and to mani-
fest their religious beliefs inside educational establishments (as long as such expression is done) with 
respect for pluralism and for the freedom of others, and without detracting from the educational acti-
vities and the content of its program. (Conseil d’Etat, 27/11/1989)
The education sector has often provided opportunities for the administrative judge to defi ne the 
precise contours of this obligation of neutrality not only for civil servants but also for pupils in 
public schools. The European Court on Human Rights has already argued that secularism could 
justify a limitation of freedom of religious beliefs, but only in a restricted public space – i.e. the 
public school.8. In 2004, the Government implemented an act to guarantee and protect secularism 
within the public schools (Wagner 2005: 182-186). The conformity of this Act was both recog-
nized by the Conseil d’Etat9 and by the European Court on Human Rights.10 The prime goal was 
to regulate the wearing of conspicuous religious signs and to preserve schools from any form of 
violence, pressure, oppression and disturbance (Act of 15 March 2004, article 1).
2 The Ferry Act deals with the free access and the obligation to public education.
3 The Goblet Act relates to the teachers in public primary school and clearly states they should be of no religious 
persuasion.
4 See also Administrative Tribunal of Besançon, 20 December 2001, M. Guilleminot c./ ville de Besançon.
5 See Tribunal Administratif de Lyon, 8 July 2003, Melle Nadjet Ben Abdallah.
6 Cour d’Appel Administrative de Lyon, 27 novembre 2003.
7 CEDH, 26 September 1995, Vogt c./Allemagne, § 53, Série A n°323.
8 See Arrêt CEDH, 4 December 2008, Dogru c./ France, req. n° 27058/05.
9  Conseil d’Etat, 8 October 2004, Union française pour la cohésion nationale, n°269077.
10  CEDH, 30 June 2009, n°43563/08 et autres.
Hermes-46-wagner.indd   41 22-03-2011   11:56:40
42
The principle of neutrality also applies to the French public media as religious pluralism and 
freedom of beliefs must be respected. The law of 29 July 1881 relative to the freedom of press 
provides that libel, defamation or any other provocation against an individual or a group of in-
dividuals because of their religious affi liations can be brought to court (Art. 24, 32 and 33). It is 
the role of the regulating body to make sure that the expression of religious pluralism in the pu-
blic service11 respects both state neutrality and freedom of religion. For instance, France 2 chan-
nel broadcasts every Sunday morning religious emissions dedicated to the main sects practiced in 
France respecting the decree of 16 September 199412. These broadcasts – under the format of cul-
tual ceremonies, or religious comments - are carried out under the responsibility of the represen-
tatives designed by their respective hierarchies upon the approval of the Home Ministry.
2.2. Current Arsenal against Face Dissimulation
There is a clear correlation between the visible and the expressible in the sense that the practice 
of one’s faith in the public sphere could challenge state neutrality but also national security. Legal 
drafters, regulatory powers and administrative authorities can limit and even forbid a voluntary 
face dissimulation within the public sphere under some very specifi c circumstances:
- In the case of identity controls, the code of penal procedure with Article 78-1 provides that 
any citizen is compelled to accept a control of his/her identity. Police offi cers are allowed to 
identify an offender in order to draw up a report (Article 78-6 of the code of penal procedure). 
- For all offi cial documents, citizens must be bareheaded for their photos on their identity 
cards, passports or driving Licenses. This obligation is in conformity with the European 
Court on Human Rights.13 
- Any individual entering a consulate can be required, for security reasons, to temporarily 
withdraw an item or a cloth dissimulating his/her identity14. This rule is also applicable for 
airports15. 
- In case of public demonstrations, the new decree n°2009-724 of 19 June 200916 stipulates that 
face dissimulation is unlawful and can lead to a penalty of 1500 Euros.
This decree follows the lines already expressed in the National Security Act of 18 March 2003 
(nº2003-239) and adds another element which aims at identifying demonstrators:
 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
- In the code of traffi c road regulations, Article R412-6 and the Decree n°2008-754 of 30 July 
2008, Article 15 stipulates that drivers must be in the position to execute any type of opera-
tion and that their vision must not be impaired. A woman wearing a burqa was arrested by 
police offi cers and was fi ned because they considered that her vision was impaired and con-
stituted a risk for her safety and for the safety of other drivers. 
11 See Law n°86-1067 of 30 September 1986.
12 Décret no 94-813 du 16 septembre 1994 portant approbation des cahiers des missions et des charges des sociétés 
France 2 et France 3, modifi é.
13 See 13 November 2008, M.S., n°24479/07.
14 See Conseil d’Etat, 7 December 2005, EI M., n°264464; CEDH, 4 March 2008, EI M. c./France, n°15585/06.
15 CEDH, 11 January 2005, P. c./ France, n°35753/03.
16 It is commonly known as the anti-hood decree.
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3. The Body – a Source of Power
Our bodies, as mediums to show religion, are now becoming a major issue. “The body is directly 
involved in a political fi eld; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark 
it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs” (Foucault 
1977: 25). Our body can show the uniqueness of an individual, demonstrate a collective religious 
identity or project the control over a certain category of the French population. 
 The production of experience is now grounded in a pre-existent matrix of body-world re-
lations of which knowledge and cognitivity are after-effects, disrupted collectively or in-
dividually in its terms. (http://www.bakareweate.com/texts/Merleau-Ponty%27s%20Invis-
ible%20Man.pdf). 
Seen in this way, our bodies may challenge in public the Republic’s values. As a direct conse-
quence, the state tries to control and regulate the body in order to preserve secularism, to guaran-
tee freedom of consciousness and of religion, and also to preserve the right of autonomy of any 
citizen.
Since 1789, religion has been kept to a private domain and rendered invisible through silence 
in the public sphere. In churches, mosques, and synagogues people openly express their faith. But 
the trend is now evolving with citizens in the streets wearing more visible and/or conspicuous si-
gns. These visual signs are elements of their faith, are either an item of their clothes or a veil hi-
ding their bodies. Visual religious signs are not new and have always been instruments to demons-
trate a collective religious identity and form part of the visual fabric of the society:
 Religious ideas become ways of expressing the body, which can be both a technology of dominati-
on and a more positive technology of self, a religious aesthetics, which animates matter. If the soul is 
‘around’, ‘within’ and ‘on’ the body, then the implications of a religion on the surface of the body cre-
ate a completely new understanding of religious discourse” (Carrette 1999: 126).
But since September 11, 2001, mentalities have evolved at the same pace as fears of terrorism and 
of Islamic fundamentalism particularly in a state where secularism and of freedom of religion are 
guaranteed rights.  Instead, these elements may be viewed as visual interferences or potential thre-
ats to national security and public order. As a consequence, the visibility of the Muslim veil (the 
burqa) in the public space has been questioned.
3.1. Visibility vs. Invisibility
An ambivalence can be shown in the interpretation of the notions of “visibility” and “invisibility” 
in our visual landscape and territory. There are two “economies of representation” (Keane 2003), 
two interpretations of these notions depending on the orientation being considered: rejective or 
projective signs (Leone 2008). The burqa can be a rejective visual sign because it hinders direct 
contact between the veiled woman and an alien gaze; however, the veil can also be viewed as a 
projective sign in the sense that the veil materializes her presence in the public sphere. This se-
miotic interpretation can also be challenged by sociocultural interpretations where visibility and 
invisibility demonstrate a potential divide between secular and religious understanding of the so-
cial order. To be invisible means to be marginalized from the visible and outside world. Badinter 
(1989) claims the veil is “the symbol of the oppression of a sex… putting a veil on the head, this 
is an act of submission. It burdens a woman’s whole life”. With the burqa, women are isolated, ex-
cluded, silenced, dehumanized and objectifi ed. The burqa is a “tool of oppression” (Jones 2002), 
a mechanism of coercion leading to a loss in public identity. “My claim is that in sociolinguistic 
terms, when such groups are oppressed, one of the manifestations of their taboos status is that they 
become silenced” (Foucault 1963: 196), and so women form part of a “nameless” group (Jawor-
ski 1993: 154). The burqa neutralizes women’s bodies and leads to a gender-blind construction. 
“In like manner, silence and secrecy are a shelter for power, anchoring its prohibitions; but they 
also loosen its holds and provide for relatively obscure areas of tolerance” (Foucault 1966: 251). 
In terms of religious beliefs, the Koran provides another perspective:
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 And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard, their modesty; that they 
should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they 
should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their 
fathers, their husband’s fathers, their sons, their brothers, their brother’s sons, or their women (Abdul-
lah 2001: 904-905).
Power is a double-edged sword. Paradoxically, the veil can be an instrument of integration (Tie-
fenbrun 2007)17 or a means for invisible women in Islamic countries and part of the Revolutionary 
Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) to fi ght back: “The surveyed become the surve-
yors”, and so they challenge Islamic rules (Jones 2002). Even in Western countries women wea-
ring the burqa reveal that it provides them with a sensation of seeing without being seen, of being 
equal to men on a mental level rather than sexual objects (Wong and Smith 2006). For others, it 
allows them to escape from a private sphere that may oppress them and so give them a relative 
freedom of movement (Human Rights Watch). Veiling or masking the face is a common cultural 
denominator for other communities like the Tuareg, but these masks did not lead to such a con-
troversy (Borneman 2009).  In some European countries, such an intense debate did not occur. In 
2003 the German Federal Constitutional Court18 held that Muslims could wear their veils while 
teaching while eight Ländern legislated to ban headscarves. Contrary to France, Germany does 
not expressly refer to the principle of secularism in its constitution.
3.2. Exploiting the fears of the visible and of the invisible
With an increase in violence, bodily insecurity and trespassing to the person, the French gov-
ernment has deployed a security arsenal to appease the population. After the case of the veils in 
school that led to the enforcement of a law on religious signs (the Headscarf Ban) (Wagner 2005) 
and after riots in suburbs which resulted in the enforcement in a 2009 decree against face dis-
simulation (the anti-hood decree), the government now takes its policy on security to a new level. 
Attention is now brought to the wearing of the Veil in the public sphere. According to the French 
Council of the Muslim sect, this garment is not required by the Koran but rather constitutes a “re-
ligious practice of a minor category of the population” (Rapport d’information de l’Assemblée 
nationale, 26 January 2010: 38). 
The Muslim veil was part of the political discourse for regional elections but also related to the 
former debate over French national identity, because 
 Veiling blocks recognition to a lesser or greater degree, would seem to be in tension with democratic 
transparency. Accordingly, in the contemporary contexts within which veils signify, visuality has be-
come central to the intelligibility of women – despite the wish of many women to be seen for qualities 
that are spiritual, non-visible, or just inside their heads (Borneman 2009: 2756).
This new emphasis in political discourse exploits conscious and unconscious fears despite the 
relative small number of women, French or from foreign origins, wearing the burqa in France.19 
17 ”Women in Iran today are no longer excluded from public life and politics, and their participation has in fact incre-
ased in some areas due to, and not in spite of, the compulsory wearing of the veil or hijab”: 19.
18 Kopftuch-Urteil, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerf GE) (Federal Constitutional Court) 108, 
282 24/9/03.
19 Only 3 out of 100,000 Muslim women. These fi gures were released by the Home Ministry.
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The French government tried to exercise power through the control of bodies in the public sphere 
under the pretext that this category of the population could be threatened, discriminated and de-
nied an equal status in society, despite the Republic’s values of democratic transparency. Politi-
cians argued that the burqa, as a “mobile prison”, could not guarantee women’s emancipation, in-
tegration and agency in the French society and so did not comply with the Republic’s values. The 
extreme right-wing political party “Front National” argued that the burqa had never been part of 
French history and wanted to “eradicate” it from the French framework. This political party used 
this argument in the recent regional political campaigns exploiting the fears of people in their po-
litical advertising campaign as shown below:
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The government carried out several missions with the National Assembly and with international 
associations, such as Human Rights Watch, in order to discuss the possible imposition of a legis-
lative ban on the wearing of full Muslim veils in public places. In intense discussions, many as-
sociations denounced a systematic stigmatization of the Islam and denounced the willingness of 
the government to control the freedom of expression of part of the population. Even as some of 
the associations recognized that wearing the veil might be imposed by men, they were convinced 
that a full ban would be counterproductive and “the result for these women could be confi nement 
in the home and further isolation and vulnerability”.20 
The bill submitted to the National Assembly was entitled “A bill to prohibit the dissimulation 
of face in the public space”21. Its content was in line with the questions of national security and 
public order and could be seen as a complement to the anti-hood decree of 2009. The bill provi-
ded that “the dissimulation of the face in the public space conveys a symbolic and dehumanized 
violence” backing national security issues and fears as shown with the public and online debate 
over French national identity22. Within the ambit of this new legislation, people promoting the 
wearing of the veil could be prosecuted and sentenced up to one year of imprisonment and 15,000 
Euros. The bill was voted on in Parliament on 13 July 2010, and on October 2010 the Constitu-
tional Council validated the constitutionality of the legislation.  However, this new legislation 
will not only be diffi cult to abide by, but will also infringe the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Article 9:
 Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes free-
dom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, for 
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.
4. Conclusion
Laws should be voted for as general principles in order to leave open the avenues of interpretati-
on. Portalis observed in his Preliminary Discourse on the Civil Code of 1804 that:
 Those changing and petty details with which the legislator ought not be preoccupied and all those mat-
ters that it would be futile and even dangerous to attempt to foresee and to defi ne in advance, we leave 
to the courts.  It is for them to fi ll in the gaps that we may leave. The codes of nations shape up with 
the passage of time; properly speaking, they are not drawn up by the legislature.”
 The function of the law is to determine, by means of basic concepts, the general precepts of the law, 
and to establish principles fertile in consequence, rather than to go into the details of questions that 
may arise with regard to each particular matter. It is for the judge and the lawyer, who are imbued with 
the spirit of a legal system, to attend to its implementation.”
In the context of the free movement of people, concepts of tolerance and diversity have been giv-
en signifi cant consideration by international, European and domestic courts within the ambit of 
the principle of non-discrimination and to respect this cultual pluralism. This idea is also a refer-
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 Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures, our 
forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication, 
and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a mo-
ral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, 
contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace. 
The role of the state is “not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure 
that … competing groups tolerate each other”.23 
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